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I. INTRODUCTION 
Feminist theory began to be challenged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as being essentialist. "as pre<.,uming the universality of women and 
defining them according to a white middle-elass heterosexual model." I 
These anti-essentialist critiques insisted on the need to speak from the expe-
rience of women of color, those of different classes and those of homoscx-
u;t1 orientation. Yet. despite both the insistence on the need to include other 
voice~ and the growing development of Catholic feminist theologians. 
there has been insufficient attention paid to the religious perspective by 
mainstream feminist legal thought.' Thus, some of us now seek to acid a 
Catholic religious perspective to the secular feminist dialogue about the 
law. 4 Viewed in this light. Catholic feminist legal theory can be seen as the 
most recent a!1iculation of an anti-essentialist feminist approach to the law. 
I. FI'vIINIS'j LH;.\L THEORy: A" A"rr·EssL/',TI·\LlS'j RE,\DER II (Nancy E. Dowd & 
Michelle S. Jacohs ed,,, 20(3) thereinafter hvll"IST LEUAL THEORY]. 
2. See. e.g .. WO~lE'-I I" CHRIS1: TOV-"RD A NEW FEMI"ISM (Michele M. Schumacher CU., 
20(4): SI:; II'R PRllll,'<CI' ALI R.S.M .. TilE CONCEPT OF WOMA": THE ARISTOIHI,'" REVOI 
llO'-l 750 Be-AD 1250 (1'197): SIS II:R PIWIlf'''CE ALLEN, RS.M .. Till, CONCEPT OF WOMAY Till 
E,\RLY HIMA"IS I RU'()Rl\l\TIO", 1250-1500 (2002). Rp,cmary Radrord Ruether sllggCSh that the 
erilical principle of ielllini,1 the;ology is the prolllotion of the full hUfIwnily of wOlllen. 
\Vhatcvcr denies. diminishes. ur distort;, the full hUlllanity or women is. therefore. ap-
praised a, nOI rcdcrnplivc .. tWJhat docs promNc the full humanity or women i, of the 
Holy. it docs reflect true relation to Ihe divine. it i, the true naturG of things. the authen· 
tic me",agc of redemption :mcl the missitlfl tlr redemptive community. 
ROSE~L\RY RADIORIJ RIII'1 IIH<. SI'XISM A "p G,lIl-T·\LK: TOW,\RD A FI,MI'<IST TilE< 1I ()(;Y I i\ ·19 
( 19')31. 
II IS interesting lhat the Dowd and Jacoh, Anri·ESlcliliulisl Reader Il()t onl) doc, not 
include any religiolls voice. bllt docs not even ac~nowlcdge that there might he one. Sf''' D(m Il & 
JACOBS, .lIipm nole I. One commentator oh,erved in 1<)89 that "[allthough it is now considered 
ull:J.cceptahlc (or "politically incorrect") to disregard feminiq writing hy women or col(lr or lcshi· 
ans. il i, apparently still acceptahle for femiIllsts to disregaru wntmg hy religious feminists'" Ruth 
C()I~cr. Feminism. Theology. ({lui ,1burtion: TO\l'ard Lm'(', Compllssion lind Wisdo/ll. 77 C\I L. 
Rl'v. 10 II. I () 15-1 0 I I t)~911 citing femil1lst Alison Jdggar' s disregard of religious i'clllini,t \\riting 
in her SUrlcy or leminist theury on the ground.s that she "finds them implausible" and "oubidc Ihe 
mainstream of contcmporary kmini':il theorizing"). The situatinn is not much diffl:rent today. at 
lcast in tile' legal academy, That Illay he hecause ,orne helic\e that Catholic feminism is an oxy· 
I1lllron. th:1I there i, a fundamental het\veen feminism and traditional religious 
thought. However. many schools of thought hm'c dcveloped within the lemini,t tradition and 
Catholic h~l1lini"ll deserves a plac.: ,I'. one of them. That i,. my conviction i, that it is po,sll1le tll 
have a more explicitly rcligi()[1\ and Catholic normative structure and ,till n,:,:o!!ni/C the funda· 
mental l'quality and right;, of women . 
. 1. I speak or a "Catholic" Feminist Legal Theory hecause Catholicism is the tradition out or' 
which I oJleratc. I Ieav.: for a different day the questir>1l \\ helher a C(/[/w/ic Feminist I.c,:al Theory 
would loo!" (or feel) <IilTercnl fro11l a Christiull Feminist Legal Theory. It is worthwhile to explore 
whether there i, a dillcn:nce hetween Catholici'll1 and non·Catholic Christianity that i, relc\ant 
here. Would il he fair to 'uggCq. for example. tll;)t if one ;,pca~s ill lenm of a Christian vs. a 
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Secular feminists and Catholic feminists share a concern about issues 
that affect women both generally and in their ability to participate fully in 
the workplace. They also share a concern about family, albeit not always in 
the same way. That is, while there are places secular and Catholic feminists 
can walk together in promoting a restructuring of the workplace to accom-
modate family, there are also areas in which they part company. This Arti-
cle represents an effort to see where those points of convergence and 
divergence lie. It does so, first, by exploring the theoretical underpinnings 
of what may be called a Catholic feminist legal theory to see what such a 
theory adds to secular feminist legal theory. It then considers how that theo-
retical framework speaks to the relationship between work and family. 
II. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF A CATHOLIC FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
A. A Different Understanding of the Nature of the Human Person 
Catholic feminist legal theory proceeds from a different understanding 
of the nature of the human person than does secular theory. Underlying 
Catholic feminist legal theory is a human person that is relational by nature. 
Two aspects to this relationality exist, in that human beings are constitu-
tively related both to God and to others. There are both "vertical and hori-
zontal dimensions of the Church as communion," the "vertical dimension 
referring to our intimate relationship with God as Trinity," and flowing 
from that relationship "is the horizontal dimension which refers to our mu-
tual relationship with one another in and through Christ."s 
With respect to our relationship to God, it is not only that we are rela-
tional, but also that we are loved and exist as persons capable of loving. We 
live in relation to, and in dependence on, a living God who is love and who 
loves each of us into being.6 And we exist endowed with the capacity to 
realize self "through a sincere gift of [ ]self."7 
With respect to our constitutive relationship to others, the notion that 
human beings are relational by nature signifies "that [our] personal good-
Catholic feminist legal theory, that one is more wedded to a Biblical textual approach (at least to 
the extent that non-Catholic Christian means Protestant)? And even if there are no large doctrinal 
differences, is there an atmospheric or tonal difference? This Article does not seek to address such 
questions. 
5. Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Pastoral Implications for the Study of Pastoral Theology 
Today, in ANTHONY CARDINAL BEVILACQUA, LECTHRESHIP IN PASTORAL THEOLOGY 17 (2003) 
(quoted in Susan J. Stabile, Catholic Legal Theory, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUDIES 421, 424 n.13 
(2005». See PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL Doc-
TRINE OF THE CHURCH'll 33 (2004) (describing call to interpersonal communion with God and 
each other) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
6. In the words of Pope John Paul II, "God is love and in Himself He lives a mystery of 
personal loving communion. Creating the human race in His own image and continually keeping it 
in being, God inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and thus the capacity 
and responsibility, of love and communion." Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio 'II 11 (1981). 
7. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modem 
World) 'II 24 (1965). 
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far from being opposed to the common good-is actually achieved through 
[ourl participation in and contribution to this communal good."" Our self-
realization is achieved in community. 
It is important to recognize that Catholic thought views persons as re-
lational by Ilalure. 1 underscore this because it highlights a difference be-
tween Catholic feminist legal theory and dependency or care feminist legal 
theory.') The latter appears to view women's relationality either as a matter 
of choice or "as a critique of possessive individualism [more] than as a 
description of what men and women are actually like."lO Even where the 
two arrive at the same place on some issues, it makes a difference that the 
feminism here proceeds from a Catholic view of the person rather than from 
a secular construct. Catholic faith supports and enriches certain feminist 
claims based on an ul1derstanding of relational autonomy rather than a more 
isolationist autonomy. I I 
This relational understanding of the human person has many different 
implications. One important implication of relationality to other:-. is that 
family (and marriage) and feminism are not mutually exclusive. 12 Addition-
ally. feminism and sacrifice are not mutually exclusive. 
A not insignificant strand of feminist thought is anti-family (at least 
traditional family) and anti-traditional forms of marriage. "Since the middle 
of the nineteenth century. but at a rapidly accelerating rate since the 1960s, 
feminism has been waging a relentless attack on all institutions, notably the 
family and the Church, that have curtailed women's autonomy."I 
~. Michele I'vL Schumacher, Th" /Vi/llIr€' of /Vmllre in Ft'm ill il Ill, Old and NeIL· From nUIII-
iSII/ tn C(lllll'lcmenlurY Unit\', itl \VO\U:!', IN CHRISt. TOWc\RD A NEW FEMIMSM, supra note ~, at 
17, 20. 
9. See. e.g .. Robin We;.,- iuriyprudellCl' (lnd Get/riel', 55 U. CHI. L REV. 1 (1988) (rocw,ing 
on conneclcdne:" or wOl11en): C,\ROL GIL U{;'\:, IN '\ DIFFERf'{,;T VOICE (19~2) (describing wOlllcn 
as Illirturer:, who are more foclised on relationships than arc mcn). Joan Williams dcscrihes rela-
lllllla! fcminists a, outlining "" new ethic of care based on a focus on relalionship, not competi-
tion: on negotiation. not combat: on community. not individual self-interest." Joan C. Williams. 
Decol1sfriwling Gender, 87 MICH. L REV. 797. 811 (Iygy). 
10. Wiliiams,lu/Jri/ note y, at 8 L\' Even Martha Fineman, who :,peaks of dependency "as a 
universal and inevitable part of the human development," views depcndency as a tcmporal condi-
tion ch'lracteristic of children, the elderly, the ill Jnd the disablecL Martha Albertson Fineman, 
Crockillg the Foundatiollal M\'1hl: Independence. AlltOlIOIII.\', (lnd Self-Sufficiency. K AM. L 1. 
GE"Df'f< Soc POI:. & L 13. I K (2000). Profc\sor Killay argues that this is not an accurate 
repre,cntaltol1 of how secular dependcney theorists view relationality. See Eva Feder Kiltay. 
Speech. Searching fil!' an ()Per/apping COl1sens1Is: A Secular Care Ethics Feminist Re.lpoll!is to 
Religioll.' Feminists, 4 L ST. TH<l:V1A.S LJ. 343,468 (200T). 
II. Sa Patricia Smith. Autonomy. Aspirwions. lIlId A ccol/lplishII1l'f/t: Some Steps alld Barri· 
ers to EqulIlitYJ(J/' WOlllen, ill FLMINIST LHiAL THEORY, supra note L at 31. There is also clearly a 
second difference in that secular theory does not share a notion of relational existence to, ;nd 
dependence on. God. Our relatiom,hip with God is central to Catholic feminist thought. 
12. Because the family is so central to Catholic thought, il is Laken up more directly and 
extensively in Seclion B. illti·a. 
I Elizabeth Fox-Genovesc. FeminislII (tnd the Unrm'eling or the Social BO/ld. XIX No. J 
VOICES (2004). amitable at hnp:llwf-f.org/04-J-Feminism.htmL As the quote suggests. feminiST 
Thoughl ha;., also often been anti-religious. although "[cJarl] feminist hostlhty to tradition did not 
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This is a central dividing line for some. Part of the difficulty many 
religious women have with feminism is the tension "between feminism's 
emphasis on women's individual goals and the collective goals of family 
and community."14 For many women, the fact that "feminism has, from the 
start cast the care for children as work fit only for servants, or at least as 
work that no woman should ever be compelled to shoulder,"15 is 
problematic. 
Viewed from the other side, 
[r]eligion is scorned in leftist secular circles for the way it is used 
by powerful elites to keep the oppressed classes in submission. 
Women and slaves and exploited workers can be pacified and 
persuaded to accept their lot because they are committed to Chris-
tian love, the necessity of suffering and general passivity,16 
Some feminists insist that feminism requires absolute individual auton-
omy, including not only unlimited sexual freedom but also freedom from 
any special responsibility toward children,I7 Catholic feminist legal theory 
offers an attempt to bridge the divide between the two sides. 
More broadly, an understanding of the human person as inherently re-
lational leads to both a different understanding of freedom and a different 
balance between community and autonomy. Secular theorists tend to think: 
of freedom as autonomy and as promoting a desired individualism. The 
emphasis is on the primacy of autonomy, individual choice and self-
determination. 
[Secular] feminism rests upon the conviction that no one has the 
right to tell a woman what to do-to abridge her right to self-
determination-or to compromise her absolute equality with men. 
All the variants on feminism are thus united by a fierce commit-
ment to individualism and equality, and all fundamentally reject 
the notion of legitimate authority.18 
always include open hostility to religion .... " Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Why Must Religious 
Tradition be Reconciled with Feminism-Restorative, Radical, or Otherwise? II COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE 105, 107 (2005). 
14. Elaine Howard Ecklund, Catholic Women Negotiate Feminism: A Research Note, 64 No. 
4 SOCIOLOGY OF REUGION 515, 519 (2003). See Fox-Genovese, Why Must Religious Tradition be 
Reconciled with Feminism, supra note 13, at 109 (criticizing failure of feminism to "develop the 
tools to understand, much less appropriate tradition"). 
IS. Fox-Genovese, Feminism and the Unraveling of the Social Bond, supra note 13. 
16. SlDNEY CALLAHAN, WOMEN WHO HEAR VOICES: THE CHALLE;\!GE OF REUGIOUS EXPERI-
ENCE 27 (2003). 
17. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Catholic and Feminist: Can One Be Both?, 2 No.4 LoGOS: A 
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT AND CULTURE 11 (1999), available at http://catholiceduca-
tion.org/articles/feminismlfe0025.html. 
18. Fox-Genovese, Feminism and the Unraveling of the Social Bond, supra note 13. 
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In stark contrast, Catholic theory understands freedom as [he "free 
choice to become the kind of person God intends." I') Freedom involves a 
choice in favor of truth, making freedom that which enables us to break out 
of the condition of alienation of self from others and from God.'o Michele 
Schumacher suggests that "[tJhe authentically liberated woman is. there-
fore, one who experiences herself as eternally loved and forgiven, and thus 
as authentically free."21 
The difference between secular and Catholic thought here reflects a 
very different view about external authority. Catholic thought proceeds 
from a belief that God "created the universe in accordance with a divine 
plan."22 As Michael Himes eloquently discusses in his book, Mysteries oj' 
Faith,2~ when Catholics affirm our belief that God is the maker of heaven 
and earth, we affirm thut there is one who made us and who gives our lives 
purpose and meaning. That is, someone other than ourselves a:,signs the end 
and goal of our existence. From the Catholic perspective, we live in a world 
that is not ours to do with what we please; we live in a universe not de-
signed by us for our own goals and purposes. It is for us to choose whether 
to live in accordance with God's plan, and thus to fulfill who we were 
intended by God to become. 
The idea that the end or goal of our existence is determined by God 
and not ourselves is quite countercultural. Our society generally, and cer-
tainly feminist legal theory, celebrates the rights of individuals to make 
whatever choices they wish, accepting that anyone's vision of the good is as 
19. John L. Allen. lr.. Th~ Word ji"O/n Rome: Bl'lJeJicr Oil rhe Fumily, NATHll"',VI C\TIIOUC 
REPORTER. June 10. 2005, al'ailahle <II htlp:l!nationakatholicreportcr.org/word/wonJ061005.htm# 
(disclissing Pope Benedict XVI's rejectiun of "the vOIUIlIariSlic understanding of freedom curren( 
in the West. i.e .. that freedom means an absence of external constraints on behavior." ami aCCl'pt·· 
ance of a "classic teleological view"). 
20. Gaudill/II 1'1 51'1',\, .wpm note 7, at ~[ 17 (contrasting freedom as "license for doing: 
whatever plea,es [one r with authentic freeJom): FWlliliaris CUllsortio, SIIpm nOle 6, at 'Ii 6 
(speaking of the "corruption of the idea and the experience of freedom. conceiveJ nol a, a capac-
ity for realizing the truth of God's plan for marriage and the family. hut as an <lutonolllOliS pow..:r 
of self-affirmation. often against others. for one', own selfish well-heing"). 
21. Michele M. Schumucher, All flumdllclioll to II Net!' Femilli.\I1/. ill Wm .. n,N IN CllRIST: 
TUWARD A NEW FEM1"ISM ix. xii (Michele lVl. Schumacher cd .. 2004). 
22. Teresa Stanton Cullet!. Indel'endel1ce or IllIerdel'endellcc? A Cltrisrinl/ RI!.i"/!fJll\e 1(1 l.ih-
eral Feminists, ill CHRISTIA" Pr'RSPl'CTIVl'S "''' LEGAL THOI i(an 17K, 178 (Michael W. McCon-
nell el a!. eds., 100 I); see Benedict XVI, Message or His Holiness Pope Bellet/iel XVI j'lI" fhe 
Cele/?rarion of' the ~Vorld DO\' or Peace 'l[ :; (2007) ("ITlhe norms or the natur.ti law should nol 11..: 
viewed as externally imposed decrees. as restrainls upon human freedom. Rather. thev should he 
wekomed as a call to earry out faithfully Ih..: universal divine plan inscribed in th~ nature or 
human heings."). 
13. MICIIAEI J. HIMES. TIll' MYSTERY OF FAlfH: A" I"TR()DlTTIO'< TO CAIIiOLICISM 55 
(2004). 
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valid as any other.24 Secular feminist theory, like liberal theory generally, 
believes we assign the purpose of our lives. 
Thus, the reality that we exist in relation to God also invites us to 
reconsider secular feminism's rejection of any notion of external authority 
and to understand freedom in a way that does not require abandoning no-
tions of responsibility toward others. Catholic feminist legal theory invites 
us to understand that, far from being limiting (as secular theorists view it), 
authority is freeing. 
Seeing authority as freeing rather than limiting has enormous signifi-
cance. Part of what makes the community-autonomy tension a genuine par-
adox, rather than merely an interesting dichotomy, is that there exists no 
clean practical line separating the two ideals; depending on one's life cir-
cumstances, every human is, to some degree, simultaneously an autono-
mous individual (or at least lives by the necessary fiction of being a 
coherent self, capable of meaningful agency) and a member of various com-
munities (family, ethnic, religious, professional, etc.), such that it matters a 
great deal how we characterize the balance struck between the two ideals in 
a given situation, and, more important still, how we assess that particular 
choice of balance.25 
The understanding of relationality to God offers another important im-
plication: that we are loved into creation by God carries with it a notion of 
gift-of seeing all as gift from a loving God. "[T]o affirm that God is Crea-
tor does not mean merely expressing a theoretical conviction, but also 
grasping the original extent of the Lord's gratuitous and merciful action on 
behalf of [humans]. In fact, God freely confers being and life on everything 
that exists."26 
Seeing everything as gift has a tremendous impact on our notions of 
rights and entitlements and of our obligations toward each other. If one sees 
all we have as the product of our own deserts and merits-as coming solely 
from ourselves-then we walk with a sense of entitlement. With that mind-
set, giving up any of what we are entitled to becomes an unacceptable sacri-
fice. If all is gift, we walk with an attitude of gratitude. With that mindset, it 
becomes much easier to give of ourselves, and sacrifice becomes a very 
different concept. 
24. See Collett, supra note 22, at 178 (citing language from Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
505 U.S. 833,851 (1992) that "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life" is at the "heart of liberty"). 
25. Gregory C. Pingree, Rhetorical Holy War: Polygamy. Homosexuality, and the Paradox 
of Community and Autonomy, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. Pm:y & L. 313, 316 (2006). Pingree 
observes that "lc]ontemporary cultural debates about the relative virtues of autonomy and commu-
nity are, essentially, variations on the fundamental question that motivated Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle: what makes a good society?" Id. at 360. 
26. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at'll 26. 
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B. A Different Approach to Family 
In Section A, I opined that a relational understanding of the human 
person implies that family (and marriage) and feminism are not mutually 
exclusive. Because the family has such a central place in Catholic thought 
and because family is so central to the focus of this Symposium, Section B 
explores more fully the role of family in Catholic thought. 
In Catholic thought, the institution of the family is indispensable to the 
promotion of the common good, that is, to promoting the conditions neces-
sary for the flourishing of the human person?? In the family we get our first 
revelation of our interconnectedness as humans. "It is in the context of fam-
ily that people learn that they are not born as isolated, autonomous monads, 
but rather as a precious part of a social unit."28 We are born into relation-
ship, bound to each other in covenant, not in contract.29 
That covenant, however, is not merely one that exists among family 
members. Family is not simply a special relationship; rather, it is the 
blueprint for our relation to the broader human community. That is, it is 
through the "complex of interpersonal relationships" set up in matrimony 
and in the family that "each human person is introduced into the 'human 
family' and into the 'family of God,' which is the Church."30 The family is 
a reflection of God's love and the love of Christ for the Church.3l Thus, it is 
"the primary place of 'humanization' for the person and society."32 
27. Christopher P. Vogt, The Family as Cornerstone of the Good Life and the Good Society: 
Family Life in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 27 REV. OF Bus. 13, 13 
(2006) (observing that the family is "an institution that is indispensable for society's effort to 
foster the social conditions necessary for all persons to flourish"). Gaudium et Spes defines the 
common good as "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their 
individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment." Gaudium et 
Spes, supra note 7, at'll 26. 
28. Vogt, supra note 27, at 14. Thus, what we are really saying here is not that the family is 
something non-family is not, but, rather, that the family is the model for ideal human relation. 
29. See Vogt, supra note 27, at 14-15 (diseussing contract vs. covenant model and the idea 
that "each and every person is always born into a network of relationships with duties and 
obligations"). 
30. Familiaris Consortio, supra note 6, at'll 15. As one commentator observed, "the family is 
a key venue in which human beings come to know the deepest truth about themselves." Vog!, 
supra note 27, at 13. 
31. Familiaris Consortio, supra note 6, at'll 17. See Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est'll 
II (Dee. 25,2005) (discussing marital love as illustration of God's love for the world), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy _father/benediccx vilencyclicals/documentslhLben-x vLenc_ 
20051:!25_deus-caritas-eSLen.html. One is reminded in this context of Jesus' response to his dis-
ciples when told that his mother and brothers were outside waiting to talk to him. Jesus said, 
"Who is my mother and who ate my brothers?" and elaborated that whoever does God's will is his 
mother, brother and sister. Matthew 12:48-50; Mark 3:32-35; Luke 8:20-2 (The New American 
Bible). 
32. Pope John Paul II, Christijidelis Laici 9[40 (1988). This understanding finds its scriptural 
roots in the Book of Genesis, both in the intended communion of males and females and in their 
participation in the creative work of God. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at'll 209 (discussing 
Genesis 1:26-28,2:7-24). 
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This dynamic allows family to serve as an important counter to the 
individualism that is increasingly prevalent in the United States. It places at 
the forefront obligations that do not depend on contract. It also makes a 
place for sacrifice-for giving up some goods to achieve a higher good. 
Marriage and family themselves require sacrifice as part of the orientation 
toward the greater communal good and remind us that the well-being of our 
entire community may require some sacrifice of unlimited personal freedom 
as wel1.33 
Catholic thought has definite views, not only of the role of family, but 
also on what "family" means. From the Catholic perspective, "indissoluble 
monogamous marriage [is] the only authentic form of the family,"34 a state-
ment that carries within it several different essential attributes of marriage, 
and therefore family. First is the importance of a monogamous marriage-
one in which the parties give themselves to each other "with a love that is 
total and therefore unique and exclusive."35 Second is that marriage is nec-
essarily characterized by indissolubility and fidelity, the absence of which 
"compromises the relationship of exclusive and total love that is proper to 
the marriage bond, bringing great pain to the children and damaging reper-
cussions also on the fabric of society."36 Third is that the family is "born of 
the intimate communion of life and love founded on the marriage between 
one man and one woman.'>37 Authentic family possesses the complementar-
ity of mother and father. 
For these reasons, the Church sees as a blight and a shadow on family: 
divorce, polygamy and homosexual unions.38 All of these are threats to "the 
community of marriage and the family."39 
In this respect, there is a great divergence between Catholic thought 
and secular feminist thought. Martha Fineman, for example, arguing in 
33. See Vogt, supra note 27, at 15 (observing that H[t]he Willingness of Jesus to sacrifice 
everything-even his own life-out of love for the church is the model of married love" and 
discussing sacrifice within the family). 
34. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 'JI 229. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the 
Church and in the World'JI2 (2004) (speaking of the "natural two-parent structure of mother and 
father"). 
35. Familiaris Consortio, supra note 6, at 'JI19. See also Gaudium et Spes, supra note 7, at 'JI 
49 (speaking of the equal dignity of husband and wife "acknowledged by mutual and total love" 
and leading to the "unity of marriage"). 
36. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 'JI 225. 
37. [d. at 'JI211. See Collett, supra note 22, at 186 (discussing Genesis 2:22-23 as an explana-
tion of "the divine plan that men and women attain their mutual fulfillment in communion with 
one another"); Concept of Marriage is Eroding, Warns Pope, ZENIT NEWS, Jan. 29, 2007 (citing 
address of Pope Benedict XVI discussing the "truth of marriage" as including an "indissoluble 
conjugal bond" between husband and wife). 
38. See Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, supra note 6, at'JI 19 (stating that marriage, 
the mutual gift of man and woman, is characterized by unity and indissolubility). 
39. ld. at'JI 18. 
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favor of a collective societal responsibility for dependency,40 takes pains to 
point out that an "important concern is to ensure that any theory of collec-
tive responsibility not concede the right of collective control over individual 
intimate decisions, such as ... how to form one's family."41 Implicit is a 
rejection of traditional notions of marriage and family in place of the idea 
that each person should be free to define family, with the law refraining 
from favoring anyone form over another. 
Fineman's position raises a question at the theoretical level of how 
there can be a collective responsibility toward something as to which we 
have no common definition; presumably the collective responsibility has to 
be toward something-something as to which we have a shared value.42 
That question aside, there is no doubt that it is a claim fundamentally at 
odds with a Catholic view of the family. 
C. A Different Understanding of Sex and Gender 
Catholic feminist legal theory and secular feminist legal theory diverge 
significantly with respect to their perspectives on sex and gender. Much 
secular feminist discussion views sex as constructed and views differences 
between men and women as socially constructed. Many secular theorists 
claim that biological principles are not determinative and that we should 
speak in terms of gender and gender roles rather than in terms of biological 
sex.43 Moreover, they view choices women make or preferences they ex-
40. Fineman, supra note 10. She argues for such a collective or societal responsibility based 
on the fact that "dependency is a universal and inevitable part of the human development," in the 
sense that we were all "dependent as children, and many of us will be dependent as we age, 
become ill, or suffer disabilities," and that "dependency needs must be met if a society is to 
survive .... " !d. at 18. 
41. [d. at 16. See also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY xix (2004) (arguing that the state should not promote anyone form of family over 
others); Eva Feder Kittay, A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family 
Policy, III ETHICS 523, 525-26 (2ool) (suggesting that the traditional form of family has been 
oppressive to women and "must give feminists pause"). In a conversation on the Mirror of Justice 
blog subsequent to the Symposium for which this Article was written, Professor Kittay expressed 
her concern "that limiting family to the heterosexual two-parent monogamous family will stand in 
the way of achieving the sort of well-being for ourselves and our neighbors that [secular and 
Catholic feminists] may both wish to see." See Mirror of Justice, Kittay's Response to Michael S. 
(March 21, 2oo7), http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2007/03lkittays_respons.htm1. 
See also Jamie Alan Aycock, Contracting Out of the Culture Wars: How the Law Should Enforce 
and Communities of Faith Should Encourage More Enduring Marriage Commitments, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 231, 232 (2006) (arguing that the law should permit individuals to further their 
own visions of the family, without imposing a single vision of family on society as a whole). 
42. See infra notes 168-174 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Catholic feminist 
vs. secular feminist grounding for societal support of care work. 
43. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Gender Difference: Critical Questions Concerning Gen-
der Studies, WOMEN IN CHRIST: TOWARD A NEW FEMINISM 3, 10-11 (Michele M. Schumacher 
ed., 2004). As an example of such thinking, in November 2006, New York City proposed al-
lowing people to change their sex on their birth certificate, even without first having sex-change 
surgery, making sex a matter of preference rather than biology. See Damien Cave, New York 
Plans To Make Gender Personal Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at AI. The proposal was 
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hibit that seem to reflect gender differences44 as themselves the product of 
"deep-seated social differences [that] continue to encourage men and wo-
men to make quite different choices with respect to work and family."45 
Catholic feminist legal theory, in contrast, proceeds from an under-
standing that there are differences between male and female that are not 
simply a product of social convention and patriarchal influences and that 
are not merely biological.46 Although women and men are both created in 
the image of God and therefore enjoy a natural equality,47 there are essen-
tial ways in which women differ from men; an understanding that carries 
with it a different sense of the balance between nature and nurture than does 
secular feminist thought. Catholic feminist thought thus embraces both the 
idea that men and women are equal and that they are different.48 
withdrawn amid criticism. See Damien Cave, No Change in Definition of Gender, N.Y. TIMES. 
Dec. 6, 2006. at B I. This view has been taken by others as well. For example, a 2007 UNICEF 
report on the empowerment of women takes the position that. although men and women are differ-
ent biologically. gender roles are merely cultural constructions, and are learned rather than inborn. 
See UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children: The Double Divi-
dend of Gender and Equality 1 (2007), http://www.unicef.org/sowc07/docs/sowc07.pdf. 
44. For examples, some studies report that significant numbers of women would prefer to 
stay at home after having children if they could afford to do so. See John Flynn, Women, Work 
and the Family; Searching for Equilibrium in a High-Pressure World, ZENIT NEws REPORT, Mar. 
5, 2007, http://zenit.org/article-19073?I''''english. 
45. Williams, supra note 9, at 799. 
46. Pope John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paull! to Women '117 (1995), available at http:// 
www.vatican.valholy _father/john_pauUilletters/documentslhfj p-i Uet_29061995 _women_en. 
html (explaining that difference between womanhood and manhood is not only physical and psy-
chological, but also ontological). 
47. Pope Benedict XVI, The Human Person, The Heart of Peace, Message of His Holiness 
Pope Benedict XVI for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace'll 6-7 (Jan. I, 2007), available 
at http://www.vatican.valholy jatherlbenediccxvi/messages/peace/documentslhCben-xvLmes_ 
20061208_xl-world-day-peace_en.html (speaking of the "essential equality of human persons 
springing from their common transcendental dignity" and suggesting there can be "no illusion of a 
secure peace" until discrimination and subordination of women is overcome, since they "injure the 
personal dignity impressed by the Creator upon every human being"); Congregation for the Doc-
trine of the Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and 
Women in the Church and in the World'll 8 (2004), available at http://www.vatican.valroman_ 
cunalcongregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_ doc _200407313011aboration_en.html (men 
and women are equally persons because each is created in the image of God, but H[t]heir equal 
dignity as persons is realized as physical, psychological and ontological complementarity, giving 
rise to a harmonious relationship of 'uni-duality'''); Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem 'll1O 
(1988), available at http://www.vatican.valholy jather/john_pauUilaposUetters/documentslhC 
jp-ii._apl_15081988_muliens-dignitatem_en.html (identifying the first woman as an "I" and em-
phasizing the essential equality of men and women). 
48. Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 47, at'll 10 ("The personal resources 
of femininity are certainly no less than the resources of masculinity: they are merely different."). 
See Prudence Allen, Man-Woman Complementarity: The Catholic Inspiration, 9:3 LOGOS: A 
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT AND CULTURE 87, 97-99 (2006) (tracing the evolution of Pope 
John Paul II's thought on the equality and complementarity of men and women). The early church 
spoke in terms of koinonia or communio, the notion that "all are equally the object of God's free 
and spontaneous gift of mercy in Jesus Christ." FRANCIS MARTIN, THE FEMINIST QUESTION: FEMI-
:-.lIST THEOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIAN TRADITION 43 (1994). Some feminists will never take 
seriously the Church's claimed belief in the equality of women because of what they view as 
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Part of this difference is the Catholic understanding of femininity as 
part of the personal identity of women. Pope John Paul II elucidates this 
point in his Catechesis on the Book of Genesis.49 "Man and woman consti-
tute two different ways of the human 'being in a body' in the unity of that 
image."5o Likewise, "sex is a constituent part of the person."51 From the 
perspective of Catholic thought, sexual differences are not merely physical 
differences, but characterize men and women on the psychological and spir-
ituallevels as wel1.52 This is captured in the notion of complementarity, the 
idea that "[ w loman complements man, just as man complements woman."53 
This complementarity means that men and women contribute differ-
ently to the life of the world. Gaudium et Spes speaks of men and women 
developing their gifts in accordance with their identity.54 Pope John Paul II 
spoke of the "genius of women,"55 of the fact that "women occupy a place 
in thought and action, which is unique and decisive."56 
Although John Paul II did not provide a full elucidation of what he 
meant by the "genius of women," he spoke of various aspects of this ge-
nius.57 In Evangelium Vitae, he wrote that 
"Church practices that originated in the tradition of women's inferiority, including the Church's 
traditional male-only priesthood doctrine." Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites. Catholics and the Con-
stitution Developing Church Doctrine. Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS 1.L. & RELIG. 
3, Introduction (2005). 
49. Pope John Paul II, Catechesis on the Book of Genesis: Creation as a Fundamental and 
Original Gift (Jan. 2, 1980), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy _father/john_pauUi/audi-
ences/catechesis_genesis/documentslhfjp-ii_aud_198oo I 02_en.html. 
50. Id. 
51. Jennifer Ferrara & Sarah Hinlicky Wilson, Ordaining Women: Two Views, Vol. 2003 
16.3 FIRST THINGS: A JOURNAL OF RELIGION, CULTURE, AND PUBLIC LIFE 33, 34 (discussing John 
Paul II's understanding of the male and female in his Catechesis on the Book of Genesis). 
52. See Joseph Ratzinger. Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration 
of Men and Women in the Church and in the World'll 8 (May 31, 2004), available at http://www. 
vatican. valroman_curialcongregationslcfaithldocuments/rc _ con_ cfaith_doc _20040731_collabora-
tion_en.htm!. 
53. In the words of the late Pope John Paul II, "woman complements man, just as man 
complements woman: men and women are complementary. Womanhood expresses the 'human' as 
much as manhood does, but in a different and complementary way." Pope John Paul II, Letter of 
Pope John Paulll to Women, supra note 46, at'll 7. That womanhood and manhood express two 
different ways of being human has meaning "not only from the physical and psychological points 
(!f view, but also from the ontological." [d. 
54. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes. supra note 7, at'll 25. 
55. Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, supra note 47, at'J[ 30. 
56. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae'll 99 (Mar. 25, 1995), available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy _father/john_pauUi/encyclicals/documentslhfjp-ii_enc _25031995 3vangelium-
vitae_en.htm\. See Pope Paul VI, Second Vatican Councilll Closing Speeches and Messages: To 
Women (1965), available at http://www.papalencyclicals.netlPaul06/p6closin.htm ("But the hour 
is coming, in fact has come, when the vocation of women is being acknowledged in its fullness, 
the hour in which woman acquires in the world an int1uence, an effect and a power never hitherto 
achieved."). 
57. His failure to more explicitly define the genius of women appears to have been inten-
tional. Mary Ann Glendon, in discussing various writings of John Paul II's on women, suggests 
that 
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women first learn and then teach others that human relations are 
authentic if they are open to accepting the other person, a person 
who is recognized and loved because of the dignity which comes 
from being a person, and not from other considerations, such as 
usefulness, strength, intelligence, beauty, or health.58 
He explicitly ties that with a notion that women are meant to transform 
the culture.59 In his 1995 Letter to Women, he spoke of women's "affective, 
cultural and spiritual motherhood," and of their contribution to progress 
measured according to the "social and ethical dimension, which deals with 
human relations and spiritual values," a measure of progress he viewed as 
far more important than the traditional criteria of measuring human pro-
gress.60 In Mulieris Dignitatem, he spoke of "a special sensitivity" that is 
characteristic of women's femininity, and of the way in which women 
model a response of faith to God, characterized by their receptivity and 
fidelity.61 
Similar themes were taken up by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in his 
2004 Letter on the Collaboration of Men and Women.62 He spoke of wo-
men's "capacity for the other," which expresses a similarity with the Triune 
God, and of their "singular capacity to persevere in adversity, to keep life 
going even in extreme situations, to hold tenaciously to the future, and fi-
nally to remember with tears the value of every human life."63 For those 
reasons, he wrote that women have an "irreplaceable role in all aspects of 
family and social life involving human relationships," both in the home and 
in the workplace.64 In his first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, Pope Benedict 
XVI talked about the "incompleteness" of man without woman.65 More re-
[t]he tone of all these writings is dialogical. Their author invites women to reflect and 
meditate with him about the quest for equality, freedom, and dignity in light of the faith 
and in the context of a changing society where the Church and the faithful are faced 
with new and complex challenges. 
Mary Ann Glendon, The Pope's New Feminism, CRISIS, 28 (Mar. 1997), available at http://www. 
catholiceducation.orgJarticles/feminisrnlfe0004.html. 
58. Pope John Paul II. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 56, at 1 99. 
59. Id. at 1 99. Some secular feminists share this view of women as capable of, and charged 
with. transfonning the world, although they may have a more limited idea of what that transfonna-
tion means. "Relational feminists' interest in 'the feminine' stems from its transfonnative poten-
tial. Relational feminists find enshrined in domesticity 'female' values that, they believe, will 
enable women to achieve equality not by buying into the male world on male terms, but by 
transfonning the world in women's image." Williams, supra note 9, at 810. 
60. Pope John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women, supra note 46, at'll 9. 
61. Pope John Paul II, MuUeris Dignitatem, supra note 47, at'll 15-16. 
62. Joseph Ratzinger, Letter to Bishops (if the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men 
and Women in the Church and in the World, supra note 52. 
63. Id. at 16, 13. 
64. Id. Regarding the latter, although Ratzinger spoke of the importance of motherhood, he at 
the same time was critical of "attempt[s] to enclose women in mere biological destiny." Id. See 
infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. 
65. Deus Caritas Est, supra note 31, at 'll 11. Nonetheless, there has been at least some 
criticism of Benedict for not discussing the contributions of women during the portion of the 
encyclical in which he discusses the early history of the Church. See Susan A. Ross, Eros and 
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cently, the current Pope gave thanks for all women "for all the manifesta-
tions of the feminine 'genius,' "66 pointing out that "without the generous 
contribution of many women, the history of Christianity would have devel-
oped very differently. "67 
The Catholic view68 translates into a different way of thinking about 
gender classifications. Although John Paul II is clear on matters such as 
women receiving equal pay for equal work,69 Christian feminist legal the-
ory would find that gender classifications are not always invalid and that 
absolute equality is not the aim?O It would reject certain feminist efforts to 
"dis-institutionalize gender. "7 1 Instead, it invites us to explore what it 
means to offer women equal respect and equal opportunity to men. 
Secular feminists would argue that equality means women have to be 
given exactly the same opportunities as men; radical feminists speak in 
terms of absolute equality between men and women in all aspects of life. 
For example, one feminist has argued that the world to which feminists are 
or should be committed is one in which "half of senators, governors, legis-
lators, and political leaders were women, as well as half the business lead-
ers, scientists, scholars, writers, doctors, lawyers ... and other professional 
persons.'>72 Catholic feminists mean something different (and I think some-
thing both more subtle and richer); they think in terms of giving women 
equal opportunity to become fully human, which may very well (indeed, 
Agape: Some Feminist Reflections, AMERICA, j I, 12 (Mar. 13, 2006). That is an omission he 
rectified in an address given on February 14, as the following two notes discuss. 
66. Pope Benedict XVI, General Audience (Feb. 14, 2007) (reproduced in ZENIT NEWS RE· 
PORT, Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://zenitorg/article-IS9IS?I=english. 
67. ld. The Pope spoke of women being among Christ's disciples and playing an active role 
in his ministry, singling out not only Mary for her special role, but also Mary Magdalene as the 
first witness to the Resurrection and, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, "the apostle of the 
apostles." 
6S. Not all of those who can be characterized as Catholic feminists agree with the views 
expressed by John Paul II and Cardinal Ratzinger in the documents cited in the text. Sidney 
Callahan, for example, rejects the notion of a particular "genius of women," and the claim that 
gender determines the "role or kind of gifts that Christians are called to exercise." Sidney Calla-
han, Ratzinger, Feminist? Not Quite, COMMONWEALTH, Sept. 10,2004, at 9. 
69. Pope John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women, supra note 46, at 'I 4. 
70. This somewhat overstates it in that most feminists would agree that some classifications 
are valid. But clearly, the Catholic legal theory would accept as valid some gender classifications 
that would not be accepted by secular feminist legal thinkers. 
71. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 9, at S02, See also David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and 
Gender, 90 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1004-05 (2002) (arguing in favor of the "deinstitutionalization of 
gender beliefs including correlations between bodily sex and gender stereotypes or expectations" 
and suggesting that the "government cannot support or reinforce gender beliefs or gender 
divisions"). 
72. Smith, supra note 11, at 26. Smith rejects the view that because of intrinsic differences, 
men and women have different abilities, aspirations or interests. Among other things, she says that 
"in the absence of any proven facts ... to make presumptions without proof' is problematic. /d. at 
27. 
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likely does) mean something different for women than for men.73 From a 
Catholic perspective, equality must go "hand in hand with ... the recogni-
tion of both the difference and complementarity between men and 
women."74 
This also means that Catholic feminist theory would take a different 
position on the ways feminism tries to remove women from what it views 
as gender constructions. For some secular feminists, lesbianism, transves-
tism and sex change "are now not only conceivable but desirable."75 Others 
have expressed the need for feminists "to disrupt the perceived naturalness 
of the links between women, caretaking, and motherhood, and to promote 
alternative life paths for women."76 Under such ways of thinking, anything 
that helps break down stereotypical gender roles becomes positive in and of 
itself. Catholic feminists would look very differently at such choices,77 
D. Vocation and a Theology of Work 
Both our existence in relation to God and others and the belief that 
there are real differences between men and women have implications in 
terms of vocation. The use of the term "vocation" rather than "work" high-
lights the importance of understanding the Church's theology of human 
work. 
As expressed in Laborem Exercens, a central theme in Catholic 
thought is work as participation in the creative action of God-in the work 
of creation itself, and therefore as means of sanctification.78 In the words of 
Pope John Paul II, "man, created in the image of God, shares by his work in 
the activity of the Creator and ... continues to develop that activity, and 
73. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women, supra note 46. at'll 8 
("[W]oman and man are marked neither by a static and undifferentiated equality nor by an irrec-
oncilable and inexorably conflictual difference."). Thus, John Paul II calls upon women to pro-
mote a "new feminism," one which does not simply imitate male models. Pope John Paul II, 
Evange/ium Vitae, supra note 56, at '1199. Similarly, what may be a virtue for men may be differ-
ent from what is a virtue for women. As one example, it may be more important for men to 
develop the virtue of humility, whereas in women, the more virtuous characteristic, given wo-
men's history, may be self-assertion. 
74. Holy See: Sexes are Different but Equal, ZENIT NEWS, Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.zeni!. 
orglarticle-19104?I=english (also noting that the struggle for equality "would not be authentic" if 
it endangers or contradicts the recognition of difference arid complementarity). 
75. GerJ-Falkovitz, supra note 43, at II. 
76. Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman's The Auton-
omy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285, 1297-98 (2005) (discussing "arIti-repronormativity model" 
advanced by Mary Anne Case and Katherine Franke, which "reconceptualize[s] procreation as a 
cultural preference rather than a biological imperitive"). 
77. In the 2004 Letter to the Bislwps of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men 
and Women in the Church and in the World, then-Cardinal Ratzinger criticized ideologies seeking 
"liberation from biological determinism" that call into question the traditional family and promote 
homosexuality as the equivalent of heterosexuality. Ratzinger, supra note 53, at'll 2. 
78. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens 'II 25 (1981). Laborem Exercens states that the 
work is "at the very centre of the 'social question'" and refers to it as a condition of cultural and 
moral development as well as economic development. Id. at 'II 2. 
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perfects it as he advances further and further in the discovery of the re-
sources and values contained in the whole of creation."79 
Thus, this sense of work as participation in the act of creation, as a 
means for realizing our full potential as humans, comes from our creation in 
the image of God and the dignity of the human person; the purpose of work 
is to create and the purpose of creation is to fulfill our calling to be in the 
image of God. While we need to work in order to live and in order to pay 
for the things we need to live, that is not the purpose of work. 
Man, then, does not work because he does not have the wealth 
stored up to constantly be at rest; man works because his dignity 
is in creating .... [M]an was created not simply for wages, but he 
was created to work. It is in work that man's divine nature is 
displayed. so 
Work thus serves (or should serve) to facilitate and encourage the 
human person in becoming "more of a human" and therefore receptive to 
the divine.s, Work, therefore, is for the human person, rather than the 
human person being for work.82 
Our human vocation, then, comes from the God who gives our lives 
their purpose and meaning. The human vocation to participate in the work 
of creation can take various forms. St. Paul speaks in a broader context of 
one body of many parts,83 with each of us having a particular part in the co-
creation of the world with God. All work, from a Catholic perspective "can 
provide fulfillment and contribute to personal, familial and human good.84 
For the most part the secular world thinks of work in more narrow 
terms. Work is viewed as separate from our spiritual life (whatever form 
that spirituality takes). In contemporary times, the holiness of work is often 
overlooked, displaced by a purely economic view of work. Even "many 
men and women of genuine spirituality . . . view their work as something 
disconnected from their spiritual concerns," seeing work simply as a way to 
79. /d. at 'll 25. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church speaks of work as 
participation both in creation and in redemption. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 'II 263. 
80. Randy Lee, Dorothy Day and Innovative Social Justice: A View from Inside the Box, 12 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 201 (2005). As Professor Lee observes, this reality has 
profound implications for all individuals. "When we recognize that work is best viewed as the act 
of creation, we are left to ask of our own work not merely, 'What do I doT but 'What have I 
created?'" Id. at 202. 
81. Patricia A. Lamoureux, Commentary on Laborem Exercens (On Human Work), in MOD-
ERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARlES AND INTERPRETATIONS 389, 404 (Kenneth R. 
Himes et al. eds., 2004) (through work the human person both "transforms nature" and "achieves 
fulfillment and becomes even more human"). 
82. Laborem Exercens, supra note 78, at'll 6. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church emphasizes that, although work is essential. "the ultimate and definitive meaning of life is 
not to be found in work. Work is essential, but it is God- and not work- who is the origin of 
life and the final goal of man." COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at'll 257. 
83. I Corinthians 12: 12. 
84. Lamoureux, supra note 81, at 404. 
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make a living.85 To think of work as purely a means to an economic end is 
obviously very different from a view of work as part of our human 
vocation.86 
As the discussion in the previous section suggests, Catholic feminist 
legal theory translates into a notion that women have a vocation that is 
different from men. Among other things, it accepts that human beings are 
entrusted to women in a special way, seeing the significant value of a wo-
man's maternal and family role (accepting, for example, that a woman's 
relationship to children is qualitatively different from and complementary to 
a father's relationship), while accepting that the role may be accomplished 
in a variety of ways. This does not mean that Catholic thought does not 
believe men playa crucial role in family life; it means simply that the role 
is different. 
III. CATHOLIC FEMINISTS, SECULAR FEMINISTS AND EFFORTS 
TO RESTRUCTURE THE WORKPLACE TO 
ACCOMMODATE FAMILY LIFE 
Despite the fact that women have made great strides in the work-
place,87 women who are mothers face inequality both in the workplace and 
within the home. At work, they continue to earn less than their male coun-
terparts and to receive less interesting work.88 At home, they continue to 
85. Anthony T. Kronman, Pepperdine Commencement Speech, 32 PEpP. L. REv. 439,439 
(2005). This appears to be as true for many Christians as it is for non-Christians. See, e.g., 
Wanted: A Theology of Work, INITlATIVES (Nat'! Center for the Laity, Chicago, 111.), May 2007, at 
I (observing that "too many Christians regard their time on the job as tangential to the claims of 
their faith"). 
86. Apart from the question of work-family balance, the difference between a Catholic and a 
secular theory of work has other implications for how we think of obligations in the workplace. 
Our views of the acceptability of certain levels of unemployment and issues of how we design and 
structure the workplace are examples that come immediately to mind. 
87. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Fam-
ily Initiatives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 346 (2003) ("statistics show 
significant improvement in women's participation in market work and their compensation relative 
to men"); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating 
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2160 (1994) (noting "dramatic increases" in 
participation rates of female work force); Luciana Reali, Women in Catholic Social Thought: The 
Creation of a New Social Reality, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462 (2005) (commenting on the 
"remarkable increase in opportunities for women and official recognition of their equality with 
men" during the past century); When Work Works: New Ideas from the Winners of the Alfred P. 
Sloan Awardsfor Business Excellence in Workplace Flexibility, WHEN WORK WORKS (Families & 
Work Inst., New York, N.Y.), 2006, at ii (noting that nearly half of the wage and salaried 
workforce is now women). 
88. See, e.g., ANN CRITI'ENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT 
JOB IN THE WORLD IS ST[LL THE LEAST VALUED 93 (2001) (citing wage gap between men and 
women who are mothers); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination 
Uiw, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. 
MICH.l.L. REFORM 371,385-87 (2001) (stating that women are more likely than men to end up in 
lower paying "mommy-track" professional positions and noncommissioned retail work, and that 
these part time or contingent jobs often pay less, are less stable, and less frequently offer "health 
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bear most of the childcare and housework responsibilities.89 Women are 
also often forced into making unsatisfactory choices, and end up feeling 
like they are not doing a good job either at work or at home as they try to 
juggle the responsibilities of both.90 Moreover, while working men with 
families may make fewer sacrifices than women, it would be a mistake to 
ignore the fact that men, too, suffer from a failure of the workplace to suffi-
ciently accommodate family needs, which makes it difficult for them to 
more actively participate in the lives of their families.91 
How does Catholic feminist legal theory contribute to our thoughts 
about the current structure of the workplace and how to change that struc-
ture to better accommodate family life? In this section, I explore how the 
theoretical underpinnings of Catholic feminist legal theory discussed in 
Section I help us to think about the workplace. Subsection A takes issue 
with an emphasis on equality as a basis for seeking changes in the work-
insurance, childcare benefits, pension benefits, or opportunities for advancement"); Meredith 
Render, The Man, the State and You: The Role of the State in Regulating Gender Hierarchies, 14 
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 73, 77 (2006) (noting that despite the fact that women and 
men have worked in "legally-mandated gender-integrated workplaces" for 30 years, "women col-
lectively inhabit a markedly subordinate sphere in the workforce"); Christine L. Williams, The 
Unintended Consequences of Feminist Legal Refonn: Commentary on The Sanitized Workplace, 
29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 101, 102-03 (2006) (reporting study findings that most women "con-
tinue to work in predominantly female jobs" and that women have, in fact, not "successfully 
integrated previously male-only careers"). The disparity exists at the executive level as well. See 
Alison Maitland, Business Life: Women Still Struggling to the Summit of Workplace Equality, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 10,2006, at 12 (reporting on study finding that only 3.8 percent of executive direc-
tors on boards are women, almost half of the Fortune 1000 companies have no women among 
their top executives and forecasting that a decade from now "women will account for just 6.2 
percent of chief executives of the largest companies in the U.S., which usually leads the world in 
business trends"). The same situation exists outside of the United States, for example in the United 
Kingdom. See THE EQUALITIES REVIEW, FAIRNESS AND FREEDOM: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE 
EQUALITIES REVIEW 43 (2007) (observing that although women comprise an increasing percentage 
of the workforce, women and some ethnic minorities "are still more likely to be concentrated in 
fewer sectors, in junior positions, and in low-paid jobs"). The report of the Equalities Review 
finds that the "employment penalty" of mothers is greater than that of partnered women with no 
children and that of single women. Id. at 63. 
89. See Kessler. supra note 88, at 379-80 (noting that women spend "considerably" more 
time than men on housework and care giving, and although the overall time spent by women on 
such tasks has declined since the 19708, this is because of "an overall decline in the hours of 
housework performed by women, as opposed to an increase in such work performed by men"); 
Naomi R. Cahn, The Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the Commod(fication of Gendered Labor, 5 
1. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 5 (2001) (citing statistics that upon marriage or cohabitation, the 
average woman adds 4.2 hours to the time she spends on household work, while the average man 
subtracts 3.6 hours); Tina Beattie, Feminism, Vatican-Style, THE TABLET, Aug. 7, 2004. (despite 
the fact that "women are working longer hours outside the home, they still do most of the house-
work and childcare as well"). See also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.I. 
57, 93 (2002) (observing that "[t]here is no known society in all of human history in which 
carework went from being women's work to equally divided between the sexes"). 
90. See Beattie, supra note 89. 
91. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Bringing the Margin to the Center: Comprehensive Strategies 
for Work/Family Policies, 73 U. ClN. L. REV. 433, 443 (2004) (finding that economic and cultural 
barriers stand in the way of fathers' increased involvement in family life). 
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place. Subsections Band C address the two basic approaches to work-fam-
ily that have emerged in secular feminist discussion: the "accommodation 
approach" that seeks workplace reforms that better accommodate family 
life and the "compensation" approach that seeks to place value on caring for 
the family. As my earlier discussion in Section I highlights, there are impor-
tant roles for women in the market workplace as well as in the home; the 
centrality of the place of women in family does not lessen the value of their 
participation in the workplace. As my discussion of the following issues 
indicates, there are some places where I believe Catholic feminist legal the-
ory would reach the same conclusions and prescriptions as those espoused 
by secular feminists; in others the paths of the two theories diverge. 
A. The Secular Feminist Traditional Focus on Equality 
Historically, much of the focus of secular feminists in seeking changes 
in the workplace has been on promoting equality between men and wo-
men.92 Many of the things secular feminists demand as a function of equal-
ity are things Catholic feminists would have no difficulty supporting, such 
as equal pay for women.93 
Equality of women is not an unimportant concern and it may not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that "the achievement of equality for women [i]s an 
essential step in eliminating poverty and fostering development ... and to 
eradicating all forms of prejudice and injustice."94 However, notwithstand-
ing Catholicism's belief in the fundamental equality of men and women,95 
from the Catholic standpoint, a primary focus on equality can on the one 
hand be too limiting and on the other can lead to positions Catholic Femi-
nist Theory would not support. Let me give an example of each. 
1. Equality as Limitation: Pregnancy Benefits 
The legal treatment of pregnancy in the United States offers a good 
example of the limitations of a focus on equality. In the early part of the 
twentieth century, not only did the law do nothing to protect the jobs of 
pregnant women or provide any pregnancy-related benefits, but the law ac-
92. This was the focus of the first wave of legal feminism, the liberal feminist tradition. See, 
e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999) (describing focus of liberal feminist theory). 
93. See, e.g., Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women'll 4 (noting the need for "equal pay for 
equal work" and "fairness in career advancements"). Under Catholic Social Thought, "[w]omen 
have a right to productive work, decent and fair wages, union membership, private property, and 
other economic benefits." Reali, supra note 87, at 474. 
94. Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious 
and Cultural Practices That Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 
166-67 (2003). 
95. See supra note 47. 
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tually "'protected' pregnant women right out of their jobs."96 That is, many 
states passed laws requiring women to leave their jobs when they became 
pregnant or after giving birth. 97 
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196498 set the 
stage for the treatment of pregnancy benefits and protection of the jobs of 
pregnant women under the rubric of nondiscrimination and equality. Title 
VII itself prevents discrimination on the basis of sex in compensation or in 
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.99 It does not address 
pregnancy and maternity and, for many years the statute was viewed as 
offering no protection for women dismissed from their jobs due to preg-
nancy and as offering no basis to argue that an employer must provide his 
pregnant employees with job-protected maternity leave. 1oo Indeed, in 1976, 
the Supreme Court explicitly held in General Electric Co. v. GilbertlOl that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute discrimination 
on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 102 
96. Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 334 (1984-85). See Deborah A. Calloway, 
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. I, 22 (1995) ("The history of 
gender discrimination in the United States is littered with cases of 'protective' legislation and 
policies that, in reality, served primarily to limit the rights and opportunities of women."). 
97. Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings o/Work, Parenthood, and 
Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REv. 531, 554 (1993). See Williams, 
supra note 96, at 334, n. 35 (citing several examples of such statutes, among them CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 7 § 31-26 (West 1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 55 (MichielLaw. Co-op. 1958) 
(repealed 1974). See also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-b (McKinney 1965) (prohibiting employment of 
females after they have given birth). Wendy Williams observes that such laws reflected the nor-
mative judgment that "when wage-earning women became pregnant they did, and should, go 
home." Williams, supra note 96, at 335. 
98. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-17 (2000). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1978) provides that 
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
100. Until 1972, the EEOC's position was that maternity was a temporary disability to be 
anticipated for most female employees, and that it would not be discriminatory for an insurance 
plan to exclude maternity from covered risks. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 97, at 556 (citing 
Opinion Letters from the General Counsel of the EEOC). In 1972, the EEOC reversed its position 
and issued guidelines that required employers to treat pregnancy as they would other temporary 
disabilities. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). See Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination: To-
ward Substantive Equality, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 351, 360. The Supreme Court disagreed. See 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
101. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
102. "[W]e have here no question of excluding a disease or disability comparable in all other 
respects to covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race or sex. 
Pregnancy is. of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly different from the 
typical covered disease or disability. The District Court found that it is not a 'disease' at all, and is 
often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition. We do not therefore infer that the exclusion 
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Continued lobbying for equal treatment103 resulted in passage by Con-
gress in 1978 of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the "PDA"),l04 which 
amended Title VII to specifically provide that discrimination on the basis of 
sex includes discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions."105 To underscore the definitional 
change, the PDA provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work."lo6 
Although there are many who could defend the claim that "the equal 
treatment approach to pregnancy 'is the one best able to reduce structural 
barriers to full workforce participation of women, produce just results for 
of pregnancy disability benefits from petitioner's plan is a simple pretext for discriminating 
against women" (citation omitted). Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136. The Court emphasized, "[I]t is im-
possible to find any gender-based discriminatory cffect in this scheme simply because womcn 
disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimina-
tion does not result simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclu-
sive." {d. at 138-39. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy was not an equal protection violation. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
(exclusion of pregnancy and pregnancy-related disabilities from state disability insurance program 
was not an unconstitutional sex-based classification). The Supreme Court had, however, ruled that 
state laws requiring that pregnant women take leave was a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (\974). 
103. See Kenney. supra note 100, at 361-62 
(Gilbert ... galvanized the feminist movement and Congress reacted swiftly .... Those 
feminists who litigated the important constitutional and statutory cases in the 1970s and 
early 19808 and lobbied for passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act argue for an 
expansive comparative approach. They claim that employers should treat pregnancy as 
any other condition which requires people to miss work.). 
104. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
105. {d. 
106. {d. The PDA is not the only potential source of protcction for pregnant women. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1993 provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 12112(a) (LexisNexis 2(07). Discrimination includes 
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an ... employee, unless such 
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an unduc hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. 
{d. at § 12112(b)(5)(A). This has lead some to argue that a pregnant woman is entitled to the ADA 
reasonable accommodations. See Calloway, supra note 96, at 27. EEOC regulations exclude preg-
nancy from ADA coverage. 29 c.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h), 1630.20) (2007). The EEOC's official 
webpage offers a fact sheet for quick reference in the form of question and answer that specifi-
cally states that pregnancy is not an ADA disability. The Family and Medical Leave Act. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/policy/docs/fmlaada.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated that reproduction is a "major life activity" under the Act. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624, 638 (\ 998). This has caused some lower courts to find that although pregnancy itself is not 
covered, pregnancy-related disabilities do fall under the scope of the ADA. See, e.g., Gabriel v. 
City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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individuals, and support a more egalitarian social structure,' "107 the limits 
of the PDA attributable to the focus on equality are obvious. Despite ensur-
ing that pregnant wome,} are not discriminated against merely on the basis 
of their pregnancy and that pregnancy-related conditions that affect a wo-
man's ability to work are treated the same as other disabilities that prevent 
employees from working, the statute merely prevents discrimination. It 
stops an employer from firing a woman merely because of her pregnancy, 
thereby providing a level of job security, but does not affirmatively require 
that employers provide leave for pregnancy or maternity per se. An em-
ployer who offers no other disability coverage need not provide any leave 
associated with "pregnancy-related disabilities." And, while the effect of an 
employer providing some coverage for other disabilities is to require cover-
age for "pregnancy-related disabilities," the length of any such coverage is a 
function of disability, rather than a function of the needs of the mother and 
child, which go beyond a medical definition of disability. As one commen-
tator observed, "by virtue of its limited goal of eliminating discrimination in 
the workplace, Title VII cannot ground any larger normative vision for the 
role of parenting."108 
Part of the tension for secular feminists is the fear that arguing for 
pregnancy benefits on some basis other than equality-arguing for anything 
more than treating women equally as men-would serve to reinforce "tradi-
tional, male-dominated family models."109 As a result of that fear, any sup-
port for parenting or family by secular feminists only indirectly arises 
where that support advances a claim of women's equalityYo 
107. Wright-Carozza, supra note 97, at 561 (quoting Williams, supra note 96, at 351-52). 
108. Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 
59 OHIO ST. LJ. 133, 139 (1998). Eichner observes that the PDA "considers only the employment 
interests of the pregnant employee by focusing on her ability or inability to work. It does not 
consider the broader range of goods realized through parenting for the employee, children, and 
communities." Id. at 140-41. See also Laura T. Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front 
and Center in the Discourse Over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEpP. L. REv. 313, 324 (2007) 
(observing that "courts deciding Title VII cases have generally refused to interpret the law to 
cover employee's caregiving responsibilities beyond the immediate, physical events of pregnancy 
and childbirth"). Even in securing its own goal, the PDA is limited. The number of pregnancy 
discrimination charges filed with the EEOC has increased thirty-five percent in recent years, at the 
same time that the birth rate in the United States has declined by nine percent. Hanah Cho, Bias 
Complaints Are Up; Some Fear Career Impact, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 28, 2007 (noting record 
number of pregnancy discrimination complaints filed with EEOC and state agencies in 2006; a 23 
percent increase since 1997, "making it one of the fastest-growing workplace bias complaints"); 
Alison A. Reuter, Subtle But Pervasive: Discrimination Against Mothers and Pregnant Women in 
the Workplace, 33 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1369, 1372 (2006). The same can be said for Title VII 
generally; "a voluminous body of social science research demonstrates that unlawful gender dis-
crimination persists inside the workplace." Kessler, supra, at 317. 
109. Wright-Carozza, supra note 97, at 561. 
110. See Eichner, supra note 108, at 133 ("Feminist theory, while rightly arguing that parent-
ing supports are needed for women to achieve equality, has generally failed to support parenting 
for the other goods realized through it, as well."). 
454 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:3 
While Catholic feminist legal theorists share a concern for equal treat-
ment of women, the Catholic concern is much broader than merely protect-
ing women against discrimination. Concern with the dignity of the human 
person means a focus on the well-being of both the fetus and the prospec-
tive mother pre-delivery, as well as on the parent-child relationship and the 
needs of both infant and mother post-delivery. And the centrality of the 
family to the common good, discussed earlier, means that Catholic feminist 
legal theory approaches the question of pregnancy and maternity leave from 
the perspective of what best fosters the well-being of the family. It therefore 
provides a stronger theoretical basis from which to argue for greater preg-
nancy and maternity benefits than does the secular focus on equality. I I I 
2. Equality as Justification for Positions Antithetical to Catholic 
Thought: Mandatory Contraception Coverage 
It is clear that Catholic feminist legal theory would not support some 
of the claims made by secular feminists based on equality between men and 
women. I 12 One example of where the two paths diverge is with respect to 
proposals to force employers-including religious employers-to provide 
prescription contraception coverage to their employees. 
Although prescription contraceptives have been available for years, 
until recently many employer-sponsored health plans did not provide cover-
age for them. 1 13 This lack of coverage began to receive significant attention 
III. To a not inSignificant extent, the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA") shifts the 
focus away from equality in providing for unpaid leave in connection with childbirth. As dis-
cussed in Section B, however, the FMLA is too limited. 
112. Perhaps the greatest divide is on the issue of abortion. From the secular feminist side, 
there has been a movement from privacy to equality as the basis for the claim to abortion rights. 
Abortion has come to be seen as a matter of individual rights and of women's ability to participate 
equally in society. Taken to its furthest limit, this results "in the claim that a woman's freedom 
from oppression depends on her right to have an abortion at any stage in a pregnancy." Fox-
Genovese, supra note 13. Fox-Genovese argues, 
Casey made explicit the social and economic assumptions that underlie the case for 
abortion on demand: since women had become accustomed to the free disposition of 
their sexuality and labor, an unplanned pregnancy should not be allowed to interfere 
with their ability to support themselves-or force a man or the government to do so for 
them .... For feminists the right to abortion is necessary to the defense of women's 
sexual liberation. For elite men and women, it is too often the defense of their freedom 
from economic responsibility for those less fortunate than they. 
Jd. So central is this claim, that many secular feminists would argue that, by definition, pro-life is 
anti-feminist. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Unraveling the "Seamless Garment": Loose 
Threads in Pro-life Progressivism, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 294 (2005). Catholic feminist legal 
theory would clearly reject both the claim that equality for women requires free access to abortion 
and that, even if it did, it would justify promotion of abortion. Given the present focus on work-
place issues, however, the abortion controversy is beyond the scope of this Article. 
113. "[HJalf of all traditional indemnity plans in 1993 did not cover any reversible prescrip-
tion methods of contraception, and only 15% covered all of the five leading methods .... " 
Cynthia Dailard, The Cost of Contraceptive Insurance Coverage, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. 
POL'y, March 2003, at 12 (citing 2001 Kaiser Family Foundation findings that only forty-one 
percent of insured employees had coverage of all reversible contraceptives, while "virtually all ... 
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in 1996, when, following the FDA's approval of Viagra, most insurance 
plans moved to cover it. 114 The coverage of Viagra and not prescription 
contraceptives led to secular feminist demands for "contraceptive eq-
uity," 115 resulting in the passage of contraceptive-equity laws in at least 
twenty states over the last eight years. 116 Although most of the state statutes 
provide an exclusion for churches and other religious organizations, some 
provide either no exclusion or define the exclusion so narrowly that many 
church organizations do not fall within the exclusion. 117 
The position of the Catholic Church on contraception is unambiguous. 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church labels as "intrinsically evil" any 
"'action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accom-
employees" had coverage of prescription drugs in general). available at http://www.guttmacher. 
orgipubs/tgr/06/l/gr060l12.pdf. 
114. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., First Oral Therapy for Erectile Dysfunction, 28 FDA MEDI-
CAL BULLETIN (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/medbulllsummer98/erectile.html; Laurie 
McGinley, Medicaid Programs Are Told to Pay for Viagra but Monitoring Continues. WALL ST. 
J., July 2, 1998. at B5; Geraldine Sealey, Who Pays for the Pill? Women See Progress in Getting 
Birth Control Covered by Health Insurance, ABC NEWS, June 19,2002, http://www.freerepub-
lic.comlfocus/news17026921posts. Interestingly. given that widespread coverage of Viagra galva-
nized the fight for contraceptive coverage, more recent statistics show that more companies 
provide their employees with coverage for contraception than for erectile dysfunction medication. 
A national survey of two hundred fifty benefits managers conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Ros-
ner Research, Inc. in the spring of 2004 found that eighty-nine percent of companies cover contra-
ceptives and only forty-five percent cover erectile dysfunction medication. GREENBERG QUINLAN 
ROSNER RESEARCH INC. ET AL., FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COVERAGE (2004), http://www. 
arhp.org/files/061504execsumm.pdf. 
115. See Carey Goldberg, Insurance for Viagra Spurs Coverage for Birth Control, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 1999, at A I (discussing link between coverage of Viagra and fight for contracep-
tion coverage); Insurers Criticizedfor Covering Viagra and Not the Pill, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 
1998, at A8; Insurers Urged to Cover Contraceptives, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 13, 1998, 
at 6C Secular feminists take the position that access to contraception is necessary for women's 
equality. See Appleton, supra note 112, at 298 (suggesting that confidence in the ability to control 
reproduction is "an important element of a full, free, and equal life" for women). 
116. Dailard, supra note 113. The demand for change also included a numbcr of lawsuits that 
successfully alleged the failure to cover prescription contraception was a violation of Title VII. 
See Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp .. 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (denying an em-
ployer's motion 10 dismiss a sex discrimination claim based on exclusion of contraceptive cover-
age from health plan); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W,D. Wash. 2001) 
(holding an employer's failure to provide insurance coverage for prescription contraccptivcs to be 
a violation of Title VII); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying an employer's motion to dismiss sex discrimina-
tion claim based on exclusion of coverage for oral contraceptives from health plan); Wessling v. 
AMN Healthcare, No. 01-CV-0757 W (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2001) (denying employers' motion to 
dismiss sex discrimination claim based on exclusion of coverage for prescription contraceptives 
from health plan): Decision on Coverage of Contraception, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html(ruling 
an cmployer violated Title VII by excluding prescription contraceptives from employee health 
insurance plan). 
117. See Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying 
Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'y 741, 748 (2005). In that Article, I examine the claims of secular feminists that the 
failure of plans to provide for contraception coverage constitutes discrimination against women. 
See id. at 767-770. 
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plishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, 
whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible.' '>118 
From Pope Pius Xl's 1930 encyclical Casti Connubii,119 through John Paul 
II's 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae,120 Popes have continuously reiter-
ated the Church's moral objection to the use of artificial means of birth 
control. 
Catholic feminist theologians have not been uniform in their support of 
the Church's position on contraception, l2l with some suggesting that con-
traception is necessary for women to have equality.122 However, Catholic 
feminists would share with other Catholic thinkers a concern with placing 
legal mandates on religious employers to provide contraception coverage to 
their employees. As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,123 subjecting 
religious-affiliated entities to the reach of mandatory contraception cover-
age statutes does not give sufficient respect to the Catholic faith and pro-
vides impetus for more serious incursions into religious entities' practice of 
their religion. Among other incursions along this potentially very slippery 
slope, it is clear that secular proponents of such statutes view them as the 
step toward, for example, requiring Catholic employers to provide coverage 
for abortions and requiring Catholic hospitals to provide abortions,124 both 
of which are clearly troubling from a Catholic feminist perspective. 
Mandatory contraception coverage is thus an example of where Catho-
lic feminist legal theory would draw a different conclusion from certain 
facts than would secular theory. Even if it were the case that motherhood 
118. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH No. 2370 (1st ed., U.S. Catholic Conf. 1994) 
(quoting Pope Paul VI, Hunumae Vitae, No. 14 (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican. 
valholy jather/paul_ vi/encyclicals/documentslhCpvi3nc_25071968_humanae-vi tae_en.htm!). I 
discuss the development of the Church's position on birth control in more detail in Stabile, supra 
note 117, at 749-51. 
119. Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, (Dec. 31. 1930), available at http://www.vatican.valholy _ 
father/pius_xilencyclicals/documentslhCp-xLenc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html. In Casti 
Connubii, Pope Pius XI reaffirmed earlier Church statements that thc use of means to deprive the 
sexual act of its power to procreate life "is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and 
those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." [d. at No. 56. 
120. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 56. at No. 13; see also Pope Paul VI, 
Humanae Vitae, No. 17 (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.valholyjather/pauLvi/ 
encyclicalsldocumentslhCpvi_enc_2507I 968_humanae-vitae_en.html ("[T]here are certain limits, 
beyond which it is wrong to go ... because of the reverence due to the whole human organism 
and its natural functions."). 
121. Compare LISA SOWLE CAHILL, SEX, GENDER, AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS, 205 (1996) ("It 
seems not unreasonable to suppose ... that fear of women's social equality with men and a 
tenacious grip on subordinating practices lie not far below the surface readings of women's 'dig-
nity' which equate it with maternity and limit reliable control of pregnancy."), with Sr. Prudence 
Allen, Philosophy of Relation in John Paul fl's New Feminism, in WOMEN IN CHRIST: TOWARD A 
NEW FEMINISM, supra note 2, at 97-98 (suggesting that artificial birth control, "as a form of 
domination or control of woman's or man's body, is not good because it inevitably leads to con-
traventions of the personalistic norm"). 
122. See Cahill, supra note 121. 
123. See Stabile, supra note 117. 
124. See id. at 765-66. 
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(rather than gender) was the larger barrier to women's participation in the 
public sphere,125 Catholic feminist legal theory would not be persuaded to 
support requiring religious employers to provide contraception coverage. 
B. Workplace Accommodation of Family Responsibilities of Men and 
Women 
There is no question that women (and men) who give priority to their 
family life are disadvantaged in the workplace because they do not fit the 
model of an ideal worker. In simplest terms, "most mainstream work fails 
to take into account institutions of intimacy, such as the family."126 Joan 
Williams identifies as a defining characteristic of the current workforce an 
accepted view of the ideal worker as one willing to give his all to his job, 
without any competing demands on his time. 127 
There is also little question that women are disadvantaged by the ideal 
worker model to a greater extent than are men 128 because of their "dispro-
portionate responsibility for work related to childrearing, housekeeping, and 
other nonmarket work .... "129 This contributes to the reality of women still 
being paid less than men and having less access to the best and most inter-
125. Elizabeth Rose Schiltz, Should Bearing the Child Mean Bearing All the Cost? A Catholic 
Perspective on the Sacrifice of Motherhood and the Common Good, LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT & 
CULTURE (forthcoming) (discussing impact of motherhood on advancement of women in the 
workplace), available at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=814104. 
126. Fineman, supra note 10, at 13. Fineman criticizes that "workplaces operate in modes 
incompatible with the idea that workers also have obligations for dependency." [d. at 21. 
127. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT 
TO Do ABOUT IT I (2000) (describing as one characteristic of the "domesticity" that she claims 
remains the entrenched American norm, the "organization of market work around the ideal of a 
worker who works full time and overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child 
rearing"); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Gendered Workers/Market Equality, 12 TEX. J. Wo-
MEN & L. 323, 334 (2003) (describing "market norm" as denying family obligations and encour-
aging workers to "attempt to win a competitive advantage in this new arena by limiting those 
responsibilities-unencumbering themselves and selling their labor at prices reflecting only their 
individual needs"). 
128. See Williams, supra note 9, at 801 (arguing that work and family responsibilities "are at 
the core of the contemporary gender system, which systematically enriches men at the expense of 
women and children"); Reuter, supra note 108, at 1370 (observing that "the male-centric job 
model continue[s] to constrain women"). 
129. Michael Selmi, Commentary, Care, Work, and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on 
Fineman and Williams, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2001) (observing that women's dispro-
portionate responsibility in those areas "substantially impacts women's paid work in various and 
complicated ways")_ Williams notes that the ideal worker norm excludes most women of 
childbearing age. Williams, supra note 127, at 2 ("A rarely but extraordinarily impor-
tant fact is that jobs requiring extensive overtime exclude virtually all mothers.") (emphasis omit-
ted); see also Katharine K. Baker, Supporting Children, Balancing Lives, 34 PJ3pP. L. REv. 359, 
370 (2007) (finding that most married women, whether employed or not outside of the home, "do 
vastly more housework than their husbands"); Kessler, supra note 108, at 324 (noting that "courts 
have refused to interpret discrimination on the basis of sex 'plus' an employee's need to adjust her 
work schedule to care for a child as unlawful sex discrimination .... "). Courts have not allowed 
Title VII challenges to various workplace practices that "negatively affect women workers, in-
cluding long work hours, rigid work schedules, limited personal leave, strict limits on absentee-
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esting jobs. 130 For a woman to succeed in the marketplace, she must con-
form to the model of an ideal worker and subordinate home life and family 
to her job. 131 
Catholic feminist legal theory shares with secular feminists a concern 
that the workplace fails to acknowledge the family responsibilities of work-
ers. It does so out of a two-fold concern that I believe is a richer and fuller 
viewpoint than the secular one. The first is the conviction of Catholic 
thought that women have something unique to contribute to the workplace. 
It is not only that "equal dignity and responsibility ... fully justif[y] wo-
men's access to public functions,"132 but also the conviction that women 
can make an indispensable contribution to the world order, making their 
active and full presence in the working world valuable. 133 The second is the 
importance of promoting the well-being of the family, which, as I discussed 
earlier, is so central to Catholic thought. 
The focus of much secular feminist theory appears to be narrower. 
That is, the focus of secular theory appears, more often than not, to be on 
the individual fulfillment and well-being of the employee parent (be it 
mother or father). To be sure, in contrast to the equality focus, here there 
appears to be a concern for employees who are fathers as well as employees 
who are mothers, consistent with the Catholic notion that both women and 
men have important roles in the upbringing of children. But the secular 
focus appears to be primarily on meeting the needs of the employee and on 
the employee's self-actualization, whereas the Catholic focus is not only the 
well-being of the woman, but also that of the larger family unit and, indeed, 
of the world as a whole, which needs the presence of women in all venues. 
In addition to a broader focus regarding goals, Catholic theory here 
also contributes a richer basis for arguing that the workplace has an affirma-
tive obligation to support families. First, as I have discussed elsewhere in 
ism, prolonged probation or evaluation periods, frequent or extended travel requirements, and the 
second-class treatment of part-time workers." Id. 
130. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
131. Dan Greenwood has suggested that the perverse "confluence of women's entry into the 
workplace with the death of social democracy resulted in recreating the American worker as a 
gendered, unencumbered bachelor. Women have been freed to be men, and men have been freed 
to be single:' Greenwood, supra note 127, at 323. 
132. Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, supra note 6, at No. 23; see Pope John Paul II, 
Women: Teachers of Peace, No.9 (Jan. I, 1995) (calling women's increased presence in "social, 
economic and political life at the local, national and international levels" a positive development, 
and noting that women "have a full right to become actively involved in all areas of public life, 
and this right must be affirmed and guaranteed. also, where necessary, through appropriate legisla-
tion"), available at http://www.ewtn,orgllibraryIPAPALDOC/JP2WOMPC.htrn. 
133. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. In his Letter to Women, Pope John Paul 
thanks "women who work" for their "indispensable contribution to thc growth of a culture which 
unites reason and feeling, to a model of life ever open to the sense of 'mystery', to the establish-
ment of economic and political structures ever more worthy of humanity," Pope John Paul II, 
Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women, supra note 46, at No.2 (emphasis omitted), 
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my writings, a central theme of Catholic thought is the common good. 134 
Because of the primacy of promoting the common good, Catholic thought 
demands that it must be the aim of every human institution to promote 
human dignity, to promote the fundamental rights of persons to life, bodily 
integrity, and "the means that are suitable for the proper development of 
life."135 This includes the workplace; in the words of the Compendium, 
"businesses should be characterized by their capacity to serve the common 
good of society .... "136 Indeed, it is especially true of the workplace given 
the view of work as our participation in the work of creation and therefore 
what facilitates our growth as humans. 137 Second, Catholic thought under-
stands work and family to be "so deeply intertwined that the vitality of each 
cannot be considered separately."138 Because of the effect each has on the 
other, the workplace must be concerned with the health of its workers' fam-
ily lives. 
In my view, none of the foregoing differences between Catholic femi-
nist legal theory and secular feminist theory create any tension in terms of 
proposals to make the workplace more accommodating of the family re-
sponsibilities of men and women; what Catholic feminist legal theory adds 
is a different layer and type of support for such proposals. 
Thus, Catholic feminists and secular feminists can stand together in 
supporting, for example, the protection afforded to working parents by the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA"), 139 which provides job-pro-
tected (albeit unpaid) leave for a working parent who has a defined family 
need. 140 They can similarly both support employer arrangements for flex-
time and telecommuting, and the provision of generous absenteeism and 
134. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church identifies the common good as 
one of the principles that "constitute[s] the very heart of Catholic social teaching." COMPE:-IDlUM, 
supra note 5. at No. 160 (emphasis omitted). 
135. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, Nos. 131-35 (Apr. II, 1963), available at http:// 
www.vatican.valholy _father/john_xxiiilencyclicals/documentslhfjxxiii_enc _11041963 _pacem_ 
en.html; Pope Leo XIII. Rerum Novarum, No. 28 (May IS, 1891), available at http://www.vati-
can. valholy _father/leo _xiiUencyclicals/documentslhClxiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_ 
en.html; Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes, supra note 7, Nos. 181-82; Pope John Paul II, Chris-
tifidelis Laid. supra note 32, Nos. 14-15. 
136. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at No. 338. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 78-84. 
138. Vogt. supra note 27, at 16; see COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at No. 294. 
139. 29 C.S.c. § 2601 (1993). 
140. Under the FMLA, an employee can take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year to 
provide care for a newborn child, a newly adopted child, a spouse, parent, son, or daughter with a 
serious health condition, or the employee himself or herself if he or she has a serious health 
condition. 29 U.S.C. § 26l2(a). On return from the leave, the employee is entitled to her former 
position or a position with equivalent pay and benefits. § 2614(a)(I)(A)-(B). The employee can-
not lose accrued benefits because of the leave. § 2614(a)(2). Health benefits must continue while 
the employee is on leave. § 2614(c)(I). The FMLA only applies to employees who have been 
working for the employer for at least twelve months and worked at least 1,250 hours in the last 
year. § 2611(2). For the Act to apply to an employer, it must have at least 50 employees. 
§ 2611(4). 
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sick leave policies, all of which, like the FMLA, "c1aim[] for all workers 
... the time and flexibility they need for family care.'*l 
Some secular theorists have argued for even greater workplace 
changes to address the hardship on workers wishing to give some priority to 
their family lives. Michael Selmi, for example, has proposed amendments 
in leave law designed to encourage men to take more parental leave.142 
Concerned that "men have not yet changed their employment-related be-
havior, and [that] employers exact penalties on women not only because of 
their actual behavior, which differs from men's, but also because of the 
presumption that women will leave the workforce when they have chil-
dren,"143 Selmi proposes that employers be required to provide paid leave 
to their employees with the further requirement that employers ensure that 
at least half of eligible male and female employees utilize the leave as a 
condition to the employer's eligibility for federal contracts of a certain 
size.144 Among other things, it is his hope that as more men are encouraged 
to take leave, the issue would come to be viewed as one that affects all 
employees, rather than just women, resulting in family leave being incorpo-
rated into standard benefit packages. 145 As with the earlier examples, I see 
no tension here between Catholic feminist legal theory and the idea that the 
law should encourage leave by men as well as by women, although the 
Catholic motivation would be less Selmi's instrumental concern than the 
idea that promoting a father's involvement in family is a positive to family 
well-being. 
Joan Williams argues for restructuring the workplace to replace the 
existing norm of the ideal worker as a man without substantial family re-
sponsibilities with a norm that recognizes that employees have family rela-
tionships and responsibilities, and that therefore does not penalize workers 
141. Joan Williams, Afterword, Exploring the Economic Meanings o/Gender, 49 AM. U. L. 
REV. 987, 1001 (2000). The U.S. Department of Labor reports that in 2004, 27.5 percent of all 
full-time and salary workers had flexible work schedules that allowed them to vary start or end 
time of daily work. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKERS ON FLEXIBLE AND SHIFT SCHEDULES IN MAY 
2004 (July 1.2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/flex.nrtl.htm. Men were slightly more likely 
to have flexible schedules: 28.1 percent of men versus 26.7 percent of women had flexible sched-
ules. ld. Incidents of jobs allowing telecommuting vary widely from industry to industry. The 
fedcral government reports that in 2004, forty-one percent of federal employees were eligible to 
telework. and of those, nineteen percent actually did. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., THE STATUS 
OF TELEWORK IN THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT 2005, http://www.telework.gov/documents/tw_ 
rpt05/status2oo5.pdf; see also FAMILIES & WORK INST., MAKING WORK "WORK": NEW IDEAS 
FROM THE WINNERS OF THE ALFRED P. SLOAN AWARDS FOR BUSINESS EXCELLENCE IN WORK-
PLACE FLEXIBILITY (2006). http://familiesandwork.orglsite/researchlreportsl3wbooklet.pdf (dis-
cussing various proposals to create a "culture of flexibility"). 
142. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REv. 707 (2000). 
143, Id. at 708. 
144. ld. at 776, 
145, ld. at 778. 
2007] SECULAR FEMINISTS AND CATHOLIC FEMINISTS 461 
who meet those responsibilities.146 How that norm replacement will occur 
is less clear; 147 the methods mayor may not create an issue for Catholic 
feminist legal thought. Again, however, I think more important than Catho-
lic theory's agreement or disagreement with secular theory on any particu-
lar strategy for making the workplace more family-friendly is its 
enrichment of the grounds for arguing for such change, and hopefully the 
capacity to change the underlying views that allow subtle discrimination to 
continue to exist even in the face of legislation designed to secure certain 
rights. 
C. Recognizing and Valuing Home Work 
Catholic feminist legal theory and secular feminist theory share the 
concern that society fails to sufficiently recognize the value of work done in 
the home to care for families,148 which contributes to the difficulty women 
have in balancing work and family. In the words of the Compendium of the 
Social Doctrine of the Church, 
[tJhe work of housekeeping, starting with that of the mother, pre-
cisely because it is a service directed and devoted to the quality of 
life, constitutes a type of activity that is eminently personal and 
personalizing, and that must be socially recognized and valued, 
also by means of economic compensation in keeping with that of 
other types of work. 149 
In Familiaris Consortio, Pope John Paul II argued that "true advance-
ment of women requires that clear recognition be given to the value of their 
maternal and family role, by comparison with all other public roles and all 
other professions." 150 
146. See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gen-
der as Tradition, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1474 (2001) ("The institutional arrangements people 
face in their work and family lives include, first, workplaces structured around an ideal worker 
who is not a primary caregiver."); see also Selmi, supra note 129, at 1557 (,,[T]he workplace 
should be restructured to better incorporate the idea that workers have children and other depen-
dents, and will need to spend time caring for those children and dependents."); Crittenden, supra 
note 88, at 258-68 (arguing that work should be redesigned around parental norms). 
147. In her writings, Williams discusses such ideas as the claim that the ideal-worker wage 
must be jointly owned and that the workplace should be run by a principle of proportionality. See 
Williams, supra note 9, at 834-36. 
148. In economic terms, society attaches zero value to homemaking and home child care. As 
Lisa Schiltz observes, "On a global level, the only forms of labor we acknowledge as contributing 
to the wealth of a nation are monetary transactions. The unpaid care work of women in their 
homes simply doesn't count, economically, because it is not paid labor." Schiltz, supra note 125. 
149. COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at'll 251. 
150. Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio. supra note 6. at'll 22. In Laborem Exercens, 
Pope John Paul II suggested that such value could be given by providing "family allowances or 
grants to mothers devoting themselves exclusively to their families." Pope John Paul II, Laborem 
Exercens. 'll 19 (1981), available at http://www.vatican.valholyjather/john_pauUiJencyclicals/ 
documentsfhfjp-ii_enc_14091981_1aborem-exercens_en.html. 
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The concern of secular feminist theorists over society's failure to value 
work done in the home 151 has led to various proposals that we attach an 
economic benefit to a parent who stays at home with a child. 152 Martha 
Fineman, for example, suggests that society owes a duty of compensation 
and accommodation to those who do care work.153 Similarly, Mona Har-
rington argues that care should be added "to the pantheon of national social 
values," and proposes that public support be extended to caregivers. 154 One 
suggestion is for the federal government to provide a "social credit," earned 
during periods when a parent is a full-time homemaker, which recipients 
could redeem to provide college education for the child, advanced study for 
the parent who stayed home or enhanced Civil Service status for a parent 
who took government employment upon returning to work. ISS These are 
proposals Catholic feminist legal theory would have no difficulty 
supporting. 
Beyond this, however, the congruence between Catholic feminist legal 
theory and secular feminist theory gets a little trickier when it comes to 
recognizing and valuing home work. From a Catholic perspective, despite 
the essential contributions women make in the world of work, women who 
wish to do so should be free to stay at home and not enter the marketplace. 
In his Letter to Women, Pope John Paul II lamented that "the gift of mother-
hood is often penalized rather than rewarded,"156 and in Laborem Exercens 
he argued that society must make it possible for a mother "to devote herself 
to taking care of her children and educating them in accordance with their 
needs." 157 
Although secular feminist theorists are not likely to express outright 
disagreement with the statement that no woman should be forced to enter 
the workplace rather than stay at home with a child because of a financial 
inability to do so, I think they do have a great suspicion about whether 
women make such a choice freely, rather than seeing the choice as the prod-
151. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 146; Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract ami Care, 76 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2001) (arguing for the need to restructure social structures in order 
to accommodate and value carework). 
152. Although Catholic thought recognizes the need to value caretaking, it is not clear it 
would favor the use of the term "compensation." The Church values those who place "themselves 
at the service of others in their everyday lives" and views this as a fulfillment of vocation rather 
than as an economic transaction. Pope John Paul II, Letter of John Paul II to Women, 'H 12 (June 
29, 1995), available at http://www.vatican.vafholy-father/john_pauUilletters/documents/hfjp-ii 
_lec29061995 _ women_en.htm!. 
153. Fineman. supra note 10, at 18 (arguing that "caretaking work creates a collective or 
societal deb!"); see generally Fineman, supra note 15l (expanding on idea of care and societal 
debt). 
154. MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALHY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS 48, 117 
(Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) (1999). 
155. William J. Byron, S.J., Children of Great Price, AMERICA, Apr. 28,2003, at 13-14. 
156. Pope John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to Women, supra note 152, at 'H 4. 
157. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 150, at'H 19. 
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uct of social conditioning. 15s In addition, I think secular theorists have par-
ticular suspicions about statements by religious leaders on this subject, 
fearing that they are aimed at keeping women out of the workforce and in 
"the kitchen and nursery."159 As a result, some secular thinkers fear that any 
emphasis on "the importance of care work, and the need for women to have 
different relations to the workplace than men ... is likely to reinforce ex-
isting gender stereotypes and seems unlikely to bring about greater equality 
for women."I60 
On one level, such sensitivity is not difficult to understand given the 
sense that conservatives have long promoted traditional family roles and 
minimized women's role in the labor market. 161 Having said that, a careful 
reading of Catholic Church statements on this subject make clear that the 
aim is not to keep women "barefoot and pregnant." In the Letter to the 
Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in 
the Church and in the World, then-Cardinal Ratzinger wrote of the need to 
keep in mind the interrelationship of family and work and the need to har-
monize the needs of both. 162 
In this way, women who freely desire will be able to devote the totality 
of their time to the work of the household without being stigmatized by 
society or penalized financially, while those who wish also to engage in 
other work may be able to do so with an appropriate work-schedule, and not 
158. As one commentator observed, 
[ilt is also fair to say that feminism has not fully accepted that, for the majority of 
women, the family remains the key to female identity, self-worth and commitment. 
Feminists have frequently portrayed marriage and family life, inspired and upheld by 
religious values, as a patriarchal conspiracy that renders women little more than domes-
tic slaves. 
Tina Beattie, Feminism, Vatican-Style, THE TABLET, Aug. 7, 2004, available at http://www.thet-
ablet.co.uklarticles/2190/. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 43-48, there is 
a great divergence between Catholic feminist thinkers and secular feminist thinkers about whether 
there are differences between male and female that are not simply a product of social convention 
and patriarchal influence. This difference explains why secular feminists might worry when they 
read Catholic writings that speak of women "fulfill[ing) their tasks in accordance with their own 
nature." Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 150, at'll 19. 
159. Byron, supra note 155. at 15. 
160. Selmi, supra note 129, at 1558. Selmi is concerned that efforts to allow women to spend 
more time caring for dependents will reinforce the idea that such work is women's work. ld. at 
1562. 
161. Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Caretaking and the Contradictions of Contemporary Pol-
icy, 55 ME. L. REV. 289, 290 (2002). Selmi and Cahn express concern that the "left's carework 
proposals" similarly cut against the goal of equality. ld. at 290-91. 
162. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collabo-
ration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World, (May 31, 2004), available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/roman3urialcongregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc _2004073 I_col-
laboratjon_en.html. 
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have to choose between relinquishing their family life or enduring continual 
stress. 163 
To address the sensitivities here, it may help to speak of the value 
being advanced as that of stay-at-home parenting, recognizing that the stay-
at-home parent may be a father as well as a mother. Thus, it is important 
that whatever specific proposals are advanced provide support to whichever 
parent chooses to stay home. 
Still, it is likely that, given the ability of either parent to do so, more 
mothers than fathers will opt to stay home and care for children. In part this 
is true for economic reasons; given income disparities, there is likely to be a 
greater revenue loss where the father stays home than when the mother 
does. 1M In part it is true for cultural reasons, since "the culture of masculin-
ity both devalue[s] carework and those who do carework."165 Clearly, part 
of what is required is a change in culture, and the hope is that putting some 
economic value on homemaking will contribute to the change in culture. 
Even if it does not result in men deciding to forgo economic employment in 
favor of staying at home, were it to result in fathers taking a more active 
role in parenting, that itself would be beneficial, not only for children and 
the family166 but also for bringing about greater gender equality.167 
Catholic feminist thought adds one other element to this discussion, 
that is, a sounder basis for arguing for societal support for care work. To 
explain why, take for example, Martha Fineman's argument that we ought 
to impose a "collective responsibility for dependency."168 She proposes 
meeting that responsibility by providing for "the transfer of some economic 
163. ld. at 'J[ 13. The same letter observes that "[a]lthough motherhood is a key element of 
women's identity, this does not mean that women should be considered from the sole perspective 
of physical procreation." Id. 
164. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman's 
The Autonomy Myth. 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285. 1296 (2005) (discussing the fact that efforts to per-
suade men to do more caretaking work will not succeed unless disincentives to men doing so are 
removed, of which one of the most significant is "the substantial financial penalty that caregivers 
currently suffer in the labor market"). 
165. Dowd. supra note 91, at 445. Dowd talks about the experience of Europe. where provid-
ing economic support alone has not proven sufficient to ensure the participation of fathers in 
carework. See also Greenwood. supra note 127. at 323 (suggesting that until it is no longer the 
case that men are gendered into and out of caretaking roles, women will bear a heaver burden). 
166. Dowd, supra note 91, at 442 (observing near universal agreement that "men's involve-
ment in families is essential to children's well-being"). Michael Selmi, for example, who ex-
presses great concern about emphasizing the value of care work, see supra note 160 and 
accompanying text. believes that a central need is to overcome barriers to workplace equality so 
that women will be in a better economic position to make effective and meaningful choices. 
Selmi, supra note 129, at 1558. 
167. See, e.g., Se1mi, supra note 129, at 1558 (expressing the belief that "an important compo-
nent" of achieving gender equality is getting men "to shoulder more of the burden of home 
work"). But see Selmi & Cahn, supra note 161, at 305 (citing study finding that "[e]ven when 
parents share [parenting] responsibilities, they generally do not completely escape traditional gen-
der patterns"). 
168. Fineman. supra note 10, at 16. 
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resources from the collective society to caretakers,"169 without seeing that 
linked to any shared notion of what constitutes a family. One is prompted to 
ask two questions, neither of which has an easy answer. First, from where 
does collective responsibility come? Mere preservation of species l70 seems 
a slim reed and the mere fact that all human beings are dependent at some 
point in their lives 171 does not by itself provide a justification for claiming a 
collective responsibility, especially one to care for those who may be per-
petually dependent. 172 Second, what is the scope of this collective obliga-
tion? That is, how much and to whom is the obligation owed?!73 
Catholic feminist legal thought addresses both of those points. First, it 
provides a sound basis for imposing a societal obligation to support care 
work. Michael Selmi, commenting on Fineman's proposal, correctly sug-
gests that the starting question is: what do we owe to each other?174 Catho-
lic thought, with its emphasis on interdependence and the common good, 
tells us that as humans we all share the obligation to promote the conditions 
necessary for all humans to flourish. 175 Second, Catholic feminist legal 
thought helps define the scope of the responsibility. As I have already dis-
cussed, Catholic thought puts family at the center of the concern and fo-
cuses on the viability of the traditional family.176 It thus frames the goal in 
terms of what is necessary for family to serve its function in the world. 
D. Postscript on the Role of Government and the Law 
One of the important values of Catholic legal thought is subsidiarity. 
As expressed by Pope Pius XI in 1931, 
169. [d. at 26. She suggests "the establishment of mechanisms that tax those who receive the 
benefits of caretaking in order to compensate those who do the caretaking." [d. Catholic theories 
would part company with Fineman here because her proposal is not linked to any shared notion of 
what constitutes a family. See supra text accompanying notes 40-4l. 
170. See Fineman, supra note 10, at 18-19. 
171. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPEN. 
DENCY (The New Press) (2004) (arguing that the state has an obligation to support caretaking 
based on the fact that dependency is an inherent feature of human existence); Kittay, supra note 
41, at 527 (arguing that our shared experience of inevitable human dependency is the fundamental 
basis for a collective obligation). 
172. As Michael Scaperlanda suggested in conversation subsequent to the Symposium, Pro-
fessor Kittay appears to be "building her dependency care feminist project from her own prefer-
ence for how the world ought to be ordered" rather than on a truth claim about human persons. See 
Michael Scaperlanda, Dr. Kittay and the Anthropological Question, Mirror of Justice, Mar. 20, 
2007, http://www.mirrorofjustice.comlmirrorofjustice/2007 /03/ dr _kittay _andJhtml. 
173. Michael Selmi asks some good questions regarding Fineman's proposal. See Selmi, 
supra note 129, at 1567. 
174. [d. at 1565. Selmi answers the question in a much more limited way than would Catholic 
thought, suggesting simply that "women are entitled to the same choices that men have, with some 
necessary accommodation for childbearing." [d. at 1566. That is, he seems not at all bothered by 
the fact that there is a need to make trade-offs between work and family, merely that it is women 
that disproportionately have to make the trade-offs. [d. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 27-39. 
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[I]t is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and un-
changeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and 
commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own 
enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same 
time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to the 
larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed 
and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as 
every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to 
members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb 
them. 177 
Subsidiarity recognizes the "dignity of each individual, created in 
God's image,"178 which leads to a bias against collectivism. 179 As ex-
plained by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith in its Instruction 
on Christian Freedom and Liberation,180 the principle of subsidiarity means 
that 
[N]either the State nor any society must ever substitute itself for 
the initiative and responsibility of individuals and of intermediate 
communities at the level on which they can function, nor must 
they take away the room necessary for their freedom. Hence the 
Church's social doctrine is opposed to all forms of 
collectivism. 181 
Subsidiarity arguably should make Catholic feminist legal thought 
more hesitant about reliance on legal or governmental changes,182 espe-
cially in a situation like this, where what is ultimately required is social 
177. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (After Forty Years), '179 (May 15, 1931), available 
at http://www.vatican.valholy jather/pius_xi!encycJicals!documentslhCp-xi_enc_1931 051 S_quad 
ragesimo-anno_en.htmL See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, '11883 (1993) 
([AJ community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community 
of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case 
of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, 
always with the view to the common good) 
(quoting Quadragesimo Anno). 
178. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on 
Christian Freedom and Liberation, 'I 73 (Mar. 22, 1986), available at http://www.vatican.valro-
man_curiaicongregations!cfailhidocuments!rc_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_ 
en.htmL See supra text accompanying note 47. 
179. See Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORD-
HAM INT'L LJ. 616, 619 (1994) ("Catholic social theory cast [sic] society as a complex web of 
family, social, religious, and governmental ties with the ultimate goal of encouraging and empow-
the individual exercise of responsibility"); J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in 
PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 133 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998) (observing that 
subsidiarity implies a rejection of collectivism). 
180. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liber-
ation, supra note 178. 
181. Id.at'l73. 
182. What comes to mind in this context is, for example, a San Francisco ordinance mandating 
paid sick leave, which recently became effective. A number of states are planning to do the same. 
Teresa Baldas, Mandatory Paid Sick Leave May Spur Suits, NATIONAL L.J., Feb. 12, 2007. 
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change and conversion of heart. 183 The law may simply be too blunt an 
instrument with which to address the particulars of women's experience. 
However, while subsidiarity demands that we allow smaller collectivities to 
function where they are capable of doing so, it recognizes the need for the 
government to step In where nongovernmental approaches are 
insufficient. I 84 
CONCLUSION 
Catholic feminist legal theory and secular feminist legal theory share a 
concern about the failure of the workplace to accommodate family life. That 
shared interest allows for a mutual support of many proposals to restructure 
the workplace and to value work done in the home. However, there are 
clear divergences. The primacy of the traditional family in Catholic 
thought, combined with an acceptance of immutable differences between 
men and women, means that there will be points along this road where the 
paths of Catholic and secular feminist will part company. It is my hope that 
beginning the process of identifying the points of convergence and diver-
gence will lead to a greater dialogue between Catholic and secular scholars 
that will allow each to grow so that each may contribute more fully to the 
building of a more just and humane society. 
183. I say this because of the fact that subtle discrimination persists, even in areas that have 
been addressed by statute. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 108, at 1370 (discussing continued dis-
crimination in practice despite passage of legislation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
184. I discuss this issue more fully in Susan J. Stabile, Subsidiarity and the Use of Faith-
Based Organizations in the Fight Against Poverty, 2 Vrr.Lo Jo CATHo Soc. THOUGHT 313 (2005). 
